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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Most of the economic literature related to pension systems has studied the macroeco-
nomic impact of an increasing size of pension systems1. However, only a few papers deal
with the impact of the structure of pension systems. In this paper, the term "structure"
means that a pension system can be Beveridgian, Bismarkian or a mix of the two. As in
Casamatta et al. (2000), a pension system has a pure Beveridgian structure if each agent
receives the same pension. Conversely, if pensions completely depend on activity wages
then the pension system is Bismarkian. The structure of pension systems determines their
redistributive properties2. The more the pension system is Beveridgian, the more it redis-
tributes resources among the population. France, Germany and Italy have a Bismarkian
structure. Canada, the Netherlands and New-Zeland are essentially Beveridgian. Finally,
Japan, the United-Kingdom and the United States have mixed pension systems (Sommacal
2006, Casamatta et al. 2000). Countries are diﬀerent from one another because of this
intra-generational component, so it can be relevant to consider the macroeconomic impacts
of a policy which changes the structure of pension systems.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of a policy which increases the Beveridgian part
of pension systems. We ﬁnd that life expectancy inequalities play a signiﬁcant role in the
study of the impact of the structure of pension systems.
There is a growing empirical literature which analyzes these life expectancy inequali-
ties3. Mesrine (1999) studies the inequalities of length of life according to socio-professional
groups in France4. The most striking feature of his paper is that a worker has a probability
1See Docquier and Paddison (2003), or Casarico and Devillanova (2007). These results are notably
questioned by Groezen et al. (2007), Lambrecht et al. (2005) or Le Garrec (2005).
2Here and in the rest of this paper, the term "redistribution" means "direct redistribution", i.e. the
redistribution of wealth through the indexation of pensions on activity wages.
3See Attanasio and Emmerson (2001), Bommier et al. (2003) or Adams et al. (2003) for a survey.
4These inequalities also depend on other factors like sex or geographical localization. For example, in
France the life expectancy of women is 84.1, while that of men is only 77.2 (INSEE 2006). Moreover, Rican
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to die between 35 and 65 almost twice higher than that of an executive manager. Further-
more, their life expectancy at 35 is 38 and 44 respectively. The same qualitative results are
observed in the United-States (Panis and Lillard 1995, Deaton and Paxson 2000). Finally,
Robert-Bobbée and Cadot (2007) show that this inequality is also observed for elderly
people. For agents who are 86, the ones with highest education level can expect to live
20% longer than the ones with lowest education level.
In this paper, we consider an overlapping generations economy in which agents live for
two periods. We assume that there is a ﬁxed fraction of skilled agents in the population5. As
the empirical literature suggests, skilled agents have a longer life expectancy than unskilled
ones. Both oﬀer their labor inelastically when they are young6 (ﬁrst period of life), and
both retire at the very beginning of their second period of life. The government levies a
tax rate on activity wages in order to ﬁnance a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system.
This pension system has a mixed structure, i.e. it has a Beveridgian and a Bismarkian
component. Finally, we assume that ﬁrms use a capital-skill complementarity technology.
It means that the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is higher
than that between capital and skilled labor (Krusell et al. 2000). This assumption has
been empirically observed7 and it implies that an increase in the capital per capita level
increases wage inequalities (Duﬀy at al. 2004).
We show analytically that if the Beveridgian part of pension systems increases, then it
has a positive impact on capital per capita. Given the technology of ﬁrms, it means that
this redistributive policy has a positive impact on wages and on wage inequalities. The
and Salem (1999) show that there are strong disparities according to the localization of people in France.
5It means that we assume that the structure of pension systems has no impact on occupational choices.
6In doing so we do not model the burden of income taxation on labor supply. We make the same
assumption as in Feldstein (1985) given that:
"The primary cost of providing social security beneﬁts is the welfare loss that results from
reductions in private saving" (Feldstein 1985, pp.303).
7See Griliches (1969), Fallon and Layard (1975), Krusell et al. (2000) or Duﬀy et al. (2004).
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impact on other macroeconomic variables cannot be determined a priori. It explains why
we calibrate our model. If life expectancy inequalities are suﬃciently high, we show that
a more redistributive pension system increases the wealth and the welfare of each agent of
the economy. Moreover, such a policy decreases the tax rate of the pension system.
Hachon (2008) makes the same exercise with a continuum of agents endowed with
diﬀerent productivity levels. Our paper diﬀers from this in two ways. Firstly, we use more
general utility and production functions in our basic framework. Thus, we show that the
structure of pension systems has an impact on wage inequalities. Secondly, because there
are only two groups of agents in our paper, it is easier for us to emphasize that the life
expectancy diﬀerential is what matters to determine the macroeconomic impact of our
redistributive policy.
Two kinds of papers can be related to ours. In the ﬁrst kind of papers, authors study the
macroeconomic impact of a change in the structure of pension systems. Sommacal (2006)
studies the macroeconomic impacts of a more redistributive unfunded pension system. He
uses a deﬁned-contribution pension system8 with endogenous labor supply and imperfect
substituability between two kinds of labor: skilled and unskilled labor. He ﬁnds that an
increasing redistributivity of pension systems decreases output but also the wealth of each
agent of the economy. Compared to this study, we make three diﬀerent assumptions. We
assume an exogenous labor supply, a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system and a capital-skill
complementarity technology. We show that conclusions are completely diﬀerent in this
new framework.
The second kind of papers studies the impacts of a change in the size of pension systems
when ﬁrms use a capital-skill complementarity technology. Casarico and Devillanova (2007)
8A pension system has a deﬁned-beneﬁt structure if it is the tax rate which adjusts itself to changes in
the economic and demographic environment. Conversely, it has a deﬁned-contribution organization if it is
the replacement rate which adjusts itself.
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ﬁnd that an increase in the size of pension systems has a negative impact on capital
accumulation, on the share of the educated population, on output and on wage inequalities.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our model and our main
assumptions. In section 3 we study the dynamic of our model and its properties. In section
4 we solve our model numerically. Section 5 includes some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We assume an overlapping generations economy in which agents live for two periods. In
the ﬁrst period of their life, agents work. In the second one, they are retired. In order
to have a tractable model which includes a capital-skill complementarity technology, we
assume that there are only two groups of agents: skilled and unskilled agents. We assume
that there are eNt skilled agents and (1 − e)Nt unskilled agents at each period t, with
1 > e > 0. There is no uncertainty. Skilled and unskilled agents only live a fraction ϕ
and σ respectively, of their second period of life. It is the same assumption as in Gorski et
al. (2007). We denote by  the mortality diﬀerential between these two groups of agents.
It means that  = ϕ − σ. We assume that  ≥ 0. For  = 0 there are no inequalities of
length of life, and for  = ϕ uneducated agents live only their ﬁrst period of life. Figure 1
represents the life cycle of an agent.
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2.1 Consumers
Each consumer of the economy belongs either to the group of educated agents or to
the group of uneducated agents. All agents have the same preferences. These prefer-
ences are intertemporally separable and they have the Constant-Intertemporal-Elasticity-
of-Substitution form9:
U it = U(c
i
t) + βT
iU
(
dit+1
T i
)
(1)
It is such that:
U(x) =

x1−η
1−η if η > 0 but η 6= 1
ln(x) if η = 1
β denotes the pure time preference factor. U it denotes the utility level of an agent of
type i (with i ∈ {s, u}) born at the beginning of period t. The superscript s means that an
agent is skilled, whereas the superscript u means that an agent is unskilled. cit (d
i
t) denotes
the consumption of a young (old) agent. T i denotes the length of life of an agent of type i.
It increases the weight that an agent attaches to his future utility. But at the same time,
it decreases the consumption ﬂow of the second period of life1011. We have:
T i =

ϕ if i = s
σ if i = u
9Andersen (2008) uses the same utility function.
10See d'Autume (2003).
11Using the budget constraints and the market conditions deﬁned below, it is straightforward to show
that T i can also denote the probability of dying of an agent of type i. In that case, it is suﬃcient to
assume that the educated and the uneducated population are suﬃciently large and that there is a perfectly
competitive annuity market for each group of agents.
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The budget constraints of an agent of type i are:
cit = w
i
t(1− τt)− Sit (2)
dit+1 = Rt+1S
i
t + p
i
t+1 (3)
with Rt+1 the interest factor, τt the tax rate used to ﬁnance a PAYG pension system. Sit
denotes the savings of a young agent of type i at period t. pit+1 denotes the pension that
an agent of type i receives when he is retired. Every agent maximizes (1) with respect to
Sit given the budget constraints (2) and (3). We obtain:
Sit =
T i(βRt+1)1/ηwit(1− τt)
T i(βRt+1)1/η +Rt+1
− p
i
t+1
T i(βRt+1)1/η +Rt+1
(4)
Without a pension system, i.e. for τ = pi = 0, saving is an increasing function of
the length of life. The longer the length of life is, the more agents value their future
consumption, and thus, the more they save. Moreover, if τ or if pi increases, then saving
decreases. Firstly, because it decreases the net wage of the ﬁrst period of life of agents.
Secondly, because it increases the revenues from the second period of life of agents.
2.2 Firms
We assume that the technology of ﬁrms has the following form:
Yt = F (Lut , G(Kt, L
s
t )) (5)
with F (., .) and G(., .) two homogenous functions of degree 1. Lst (L
u
t ) denote the
quantity of skilled (unskilled) labor used in the production function. F () and G() are such
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that12:
Fi > 0 and Gi > 0
Fii < 0 and Gii < 0
Fij > 0 and Gij > 0 with i 6= j
We assume a perfect competition on the ﬁnal good market and on inputs markets. It
implies that, at equilibrium, wages and capital return are:
wut = F1((1− e), G(kt, e)) ≡ wu(kt) (6)
wst = F2((1− e), G(kt, e))G2(kt, e) ≡ ws(kt) (7)
Rt = F2((1− e), G(kt, e))G1(kt, e) ≡ R(kt) (8)
with kt = Kt/Nt. Given the properties of the functions F () and G(), it can be shown
that:
∂R(kt)
∂kt
< 0
∂wu(kt)
∂kt
> 0
A priori, we cannot determine the sign of the derivative of ws(kt) with respect to kt.
As in Duﬀy et al. (2004), in the rest of this paper we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1:
∂ws(kt)/∂kt
ws(kt)
kt >
∂wu(kt)/∂kt
wu(kt)
kt.
This assumption necessarily implies that ∂ws(kt)/∂kt > 0. It means that the elasticity
of the wages of skilled agents with respect to capital per capita is higher than the one
12gi denotes the derivative of g() with respect to its ith argument. gij denotes the derivative of gi with
respect to its jth argument.
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concerning the wages of unskilled agents. Appendix 2 shows that this assumption is cor-
related with the capital-skill complementarity technology. In this paper, Iw denotes the
wage inequality ratio. It is such that:
Iw,t =
wst
wut
(9)
Given assumption 1, this wage inequality ratio is an increasing function of kt.
Furthermore, we make the following assumption13:
Assumption 2: There exists a threshold value k˜ suﬃciently small, such that wu(kt) <
ws(kt), ∀kt ≥ k˜ with k˜ ≥ 0. We have k˜ = 0 if ws(0) ≥ wu(0), and k˜ > 0 if ws(0) < wu(0).
Even if this assumption seems obvious, the general form we use does not necessarily
implies that wu(kt) < ws(kt), ∀kt ≥ 0. However, given assumption 1, we can reasonably
assume that there exists a small threshold value k˜ such that the wage level of skilled agents
is higher than the one of unskilled agents.
2.3 Government
We assume a PAYG pension system. The revenues of this system come from a proportional
tax on wages: τt. These revenues are used to provide a pension for elderly people. Their
pension depends on the wages of young agents having the same productivity as them, and
on the average wage of the economy. Their respective weighting is λ and (1 − λ). The
ﬁrst part of this pension represents the Bismarkian component, whereas the second part
represents the Beveridgian component of this system (Casamatta et al., 2000). λ measures
13This assumption is reasonable as long as unskilled labor is not scarce.
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the indexation of pensions on the activity wages of agents. If λ = 0, each agent receives
the same pension and the pension system is completely Beveridgian. Conversely, if λ = 1
the level of pensions only depends on the wage of agents and the pension system is purely
Bismarkian. The smaller λ is, the more this pension system is redistributive.14.
Consumers receive only a fraction ν (with 0 < ν ≤ 1) of this weighted average, and
only during their second period of life T i. ν denotes the average replacement rate of the
pension system.
The pension level of an agent of type i is:
pit+1 = ν
(
λwit+1 + (1− λ)w¯t+1
)
T i (10)
The budget constraint of the government can be written:
τtNtwt = Nt−1 [eν(λwst + (1− λ)wt)ϕ+ (1− e)ν(λwut + (1− λ)wt)σ] (11)
with wt the average wage of the economy. It is obtained by:
wt = ewst + (1− e)wut (12)
Some simple manipulations imply that the tax rate can be expressed as:
τt =
ν
1 + n
[
ϕ− (1− e)
(
λ
wu(kt)
w(kt)
+ 1− λ
)]
(13)
If  = 0, the tax rate is simply equal to the product between the replacement rate and
the old-age dependency ratio of the economy (d'Autume, 2003). The second component
14In this paper the term "redistributivity" only concerns the direct redistribution of pension systems
and not the eﬀective redistribution of pension systems. The eﬀective redistribution, which is the diﬀerence
between tax paid and amount received, can be very diﬀerent because of life expectancy inequalities.
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between brackets is the ratio between the pensions not paid to unskilled agents because of
their lower length of life, and the average wage of the economy. Ceteris paribus, under the
reasonable assumption that wut < w
s
t , ∀t, the tax rate is an increasing function of λ. This
result is very intuitive. Indeed, educated agents have the longer length of life. Therefore,
an increase in λ (i.e. a decrease in the redistributivity of the pension system) increases the
indexation of pensions on wages. It implies that the pension of skilled agents increases.
Moreover, they beneﬁt from these pensions for a longer period of time than other agents.
Consequently, the tax rate has to increase to ﬁnance these additional expenditures.
Another interesting point is that the tax rate τt is an increasing function of kt. Indeed,
under assumption 1, it is straightforward to show that wu(kt)/w(kt) is a decreasing function
of kt. It means that the relative cost not paid to unskilled agents, because of their lower
length of life, decreases with the level of capital per capita.
3 The Equilibrium and its Properties
All markets clear at each period t if:
Lst = eNt (14)
Lut = (1− e)Nt (15)
Kt+1 = eNtSst + (1− e)NtSut (16)
The dynamic of the economy is obtained using equations (4), (6), (7), (8), (10), (12),
(13), (14), (15) and (16).
It is straightforward to show that we obtain:
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LHS(kt+1, λ) ≡
(1 + n)kt+1 + e
ps(kt+1, λ)
ϕ(βR(kt+1))1/η +R(kt+1)
+ (1− e) p
u(kt+1, λ)
σ(βR(kt+1))1/η +R(kt+1)
=
(1− τ(kt, λ))[e ϕ(βR(kt+1))
1/η
ϕ(βR(kt+1))1/η +R(kt+1)
ws(kt)+
(1− e) σ(βR(kt+1))
1/η
σ(βR(kt+1))1/η +R(kt+1)
wu(kt)] ≡ RHS(kt+1, kt, λ) (17)
Since the dynamic of the economy is complicated we make two further assumptions15:
Assumption 3: The equilibrium trajectory is unique and increasing. It can be writ-
ten: kt+1 = Ψ(kt), with Ψ1(kt) > 0.
Assumption 4: There exists at least one non-trivial stable steady state (ksSS) such
that ksSS > k˜.
These two assumptions are suﬃcient to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1: An increase in λ has a negative impact on every stable steady state
(ksSS). Consequently, it also decreases wage inequalities.
Proof : See appendix 1.2
Proposition 1 shows that a more redistributive pension system (a decrease in λ) in-
15We show in the next section that the following assumptions are checked for reasonable values of
parameters.
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creases the level of capital per capita. Indeed, a decrease in λ has two kinds of eﬀects on
saving. The ﬁrst one is to decrease the tax rate τ for a given level of capital per capita.
Then, the net wage of every consumer increases. It has a positive impact on saving. The
second one is a pension eﬀect. Unskilled agents decide to decrease their saving because they
beneﬁt from a more redistributive pension system. But at the same time, skilled agents
increase their saving because pensions are less indexed on activity wages. The increase in
saving of skilled agents overcompensates the decrease of the one of unskilled agents because
skilled agents live for a longer period of time.
Given our technology and under assumption 1, a decrease in λ also implies that wage
inequalities (Iw) increase.
Let us now consider the impact of this redistributive policy on the wealth level and on
the welfare level of every agent. These analytical results are obtained at steady state to
simplify the exposition. Every derivative is thus a comparison between steady states.
The wealth level of an agent of type i, with i ∈ {s, u}, can be written:
W i(λ) = wi(k(λ))(1− τ(k(λ), λ)) + p
i(k(λ), λ)
R(k(λ))
(18)
with k′(λ) < 0. The net impact of a decrease in λ on W i() is:
−dW
i(λ)
dλ
= −dw
i(k)
dk
dk
dλ
(1− τ(k, λ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
A>0
+wi(k)
(
∂τ(k, λ)
∂k
dk
dλ
+
∂τ(k, λ)
∂λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B≶0
− 1
R(k)
(
∂pi(k, λ)
∂k
dk
dλ
+
∂pi(k, λ)
∂λ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C>0 if i=u, C≶0 if i=s
+ pi(k, λ)
dR(k)
dk
dk
dλ
(R(k))2︸ ︷︷ ︸
D>0
(19)
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Element A is positive because of the positive impact of the redistributive pension system
on the wage level, through capital accumulation. Element B can be positive or negative.
Indeed, as mentioned above, a more redistributive pension system has a direct negative im-
pact on the tax rate because the pension system redistributes resources in favour of agents
having a short life expectancy. However, as this policy increases capital accumulation, it
reduces the relative share of expenditures not spent because of the mortality diﬀerential16.
The net impact on the tax rate is thus ambiguous, but we can reasonably assume that the
direct impact is higher than the one going through capital accumulation. It implies that
a more redistributive pension system reduces the tax rate, which has a positive impact on
the wealth level.
Element C has an ambiguous sign. Indeed, a more redistributive pension system in-
creases the wage level of every agent, which has a positive impact on pensions. However, λ
has a direct impact on pensions through the indexation of pensions on wages. For unskilled
agents, a more redistributive pension system increases their pensions, and thus C is positive
since every eﬀect has the same sign. But for skilled agents, a more redistributive pension
system decreases their pension for a given level of capital per worker. Consequently, the
net impact on C is ambiguous for skilled agents.
Finally, element D is positive because of the negative impact of a more redistributive
pension system on the interest factor.
We can reasonably conclude from this analysis that it is almost sure that unskilled
agents highly beneﬁt from a more redistributive pension system. However, the ﬁnal im-
pact is ambiguous for skilled agents. The indirect impact on capital accumulation has to
be large for educated agents to beneﬁt from this policy. It implies that life expectancy
16See the discussion about equation (13).
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inequalities have to be high17.
Let us now consider the impact of this policy on the welfare level of agents.
Using equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) we obtain:
U i(λ) =
(ci(λ))1−η
1− η + β(T
i)η
(di(λ))1−η
1− η (20)
with:
ci(λ) =
W i(λ)
1 + β1/η(R(k(λ)))(1−η)/ηT i
(21)
and,
di(λ) =
W i(λ)β1/ηT i
(R(k(λ)))−1/η + β1/ηT i(R(k(λ)))−1
(22)
The impact of a decrease in λ on consumption ﬂows is a priori ambiguous. Indeed, a
more redistributive pension system has an impact on the wealth level of agents. However,
as it also has an impact on the interest factor, it inﬂuences the price of the second period
consumption (d)18. Let us ﬁrst consider that a decrease in λ has a positive impact on the
wealth level of agents (W i). Then, two cases have to be considered. The ﬁrst one is such
that η < 1. It implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high. In that
case, a decrease in λ has a positive impact on the ﬁrst period consumption (c). Indeed,
the wealth level and the price of the second period consumption increase. Consequently,
agents prefer increasing their ﬁrst period consumption. The net impact on the second
17In the calibration exercise, we emphasize this point.
18The price of the second period consumption is the inverse of the interest factor. A decrease in R
increases the price of the second period consumption.
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period consumption is ambiguous. It depends on the scale of the wealth eﬀect and of the
price eﬀect (through the interest factor).
The second case which has to be considered, is the case in which η > 1, i.e. the case
of a small intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In that case, the impact of a more
redistributive pension system on consumption levels is ambiguous whatever the period
considered.
Finally, if a decrease in λ has a negative impact on the wealth level, then if η > 1,
consumption levels of every period decrease. If η < 1, then the second period consumption
decreases whereas the impact on the ﬁrst period consumption is ambiguous. However, we
can reasonably assume that the consumption level of every period will decrease.
Since we cannot determine a priori the impact of a more redistributive pension system
on wealth, on welfare, and on wealth inequalities, we calibrate and we solve our model
numerically.
4 Calibration and Results
Firstly, we specify our production function and we detail our calibration choices. Then, we
give the results of the numerical resolution of our model.
4.1 Calibration
In this section, we specify the functional form of the production function and we calibrate
our model to study the impact of the redistribtutivity of pension systems on macroeco-
nomic variables.
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Firstly, we assume that the production function has the following form:
F (Lut , Xt) = A [α(L
u
t )
υ + (1− α)Xυt ]1/υ (23)
and,
Xt ≡ G(Kt, Lst ) = [bKγt + (1− b)(Lst )γ ]1/γ (24)
with A > 0 the level of the technology, υ, γ < 1 and b, α ∈ (0, 1). Using Sato's (1967)
results and the study of Duﬀy et al. (2004), we show that there exists a capital-skill
complementarity if and only if υ > γ. This condition is necessary and suﬃcient for capital
and skilled labor to be more complementary than capital and unskilled labor19.
It can be shown that the wage inequality ratio: Iw = ws(kt)/wu(kt) is an increasing
function of kt if and only if υ > γ.
We calibrate the parameters υ and γ of the production function to match the ﬁndings of
Fallon and Layard (1975). They ﬁnd that, for a restricted set of rich countries, the elasticity
of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is 1.85, whereas the one between cap-
ital and skilled labor is 0.55. Given our technology, it implies that υ = 0.46 and γ = −0.81.
Secondly, we calibrate the basic parameters of the model. The length of each period is
40 years. The growth rate of the population is n = 0.3. It corresponds to an annual growth
rate of the population of 0.65% (Charpin, 1999). The pure time preference factor is β = 0.6
(d'Autume 2003), i.e. an annual psychological discount rate of 1.3%. Moreover, we assume
that η ≥ 1. It means that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low. Agents prefer
smoothing their consumption. This assumption is in accordance with Attanasio et al.
19See Duﬀy et al. (2004). This condition is necessary and suﬃcient using either the Allen-Uzawa partial
elasticity of substitution, or the Hicks-Allen direct partial elasticity of substitution.
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(1999) and with Cooley and Prescott (1995). It is the same as the one used in Casamatta
et al. (2000). More speciﬁcally, we assume that η = 1.5 as in Sommacal (2006).
Moreover, we ﬁrst assume that ϕ = 0.55, σ = 0.45 and thus that  = 0.1. It means
that the length of life of an educated agent is 82 years20, and the one of unskilled agents
is 78 years. The life expectancy diﬀerential is 4 years. The life expectancy gap is smaller
than the one found by Mesrine (1999) between the highest and the lowest socio-professional
group. Since the indirect eﬀects depend on the value taken by , we discuss the impact of
a redistributive policy for diﬀerent values taken by this parameter.
The share of the educated population is 0.4 (e = 0.4) as in Sommacal (2006) and in
Acemoglu (2002). As in their studies, our model will have to match the wage gap Iw found
by Acemoglu (2002).
Thirdly, we calibrate our model to match some empirical facts. The average replacement
rate is ﬁxed for the tax rate of the pension system to be around 20% as reported in Nyce
and Schieber (2005). We obtain ν = 0.55. This value is in accordance with the empirical
ﬁndings of Nyce and Schieber (2005), and this value is the same as the parametrization
used in d'Autume (2003).
There only remains to ﬁx α, b andA. We ﬁx them for our model to reproduce three facts.
Firstly, the capital share in total output has to be near 0.33. Secondly, the annual interest
rate has to be in the reasonable interval [0.03, 0.05]. And ﬁnally, following Sommacal
(2006) and Acemoglu (2002), the wage premium ws/wu has to be near 1.7. If (A, b, α) =
(3, 0.12, 0.23), then these three facts are observed at the steady state of our economy.
With this calibration, we ﬁnd a tax rate τ for the pension system around 0.21. Table 1
summarizes our calibration.
20In our model we do not include the very ﬁrst period of life during which an agent is young. We
assume that the length of this period is 20 years. Thus the life expectancy of skilled agents is obtained by:
20 + 40 + ϕ× 40.
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
n 0.3 η 1.5
β 0.6 A 3
ϕ 0.55 b 0.12
σ 0.45 α 0.23
ν 0.55 υ 0.46
e 0.4 γ -0.81
Table 1: Calibration of the model
4.2 Steady State Eﬀects
In this section we analyze the impact of a decrease in λ on the economic variables at steady
state (see Figures 2-10).
We observe that the capital level per capita is a decreasing function of λ as in our
proposition 1. It implies that wage levels and wage inequalities increase with the redis-
tributivity of pension systems. Another important point is that the decrease in λ has a
negative impact on the pensions of educated agents. It means that the direct decrease in
the indexation of pensions on activity wages overcompensates the increase in wages im-
plied by a more redistributive pension system. Obviously, the pensions of unskilled agents
decrease with λ because all eﬀects go in the same way.
The total impact of a decrease in λ on the wealth of every agent is positive. It means
that the decrease in the pensions of skilled agents is overcompensated by the increase in
their wages. For unskilled agents the positive impact is more trivial as wages and pensions
increase.
We also ﬁnd that wealth inequalities decrease with the level of redistribution of pension
systems. It implies that the direct redistribution of pension systems overcompensates the
increase in wage inequalities.
The tax rate is a decreasing function of the beveridgian part of pension systems as can
be observed empirically. Finally, we ﬁnd that every agent of the economy beneﬁts from a
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Variables  = 0.02  = 0.1  = 0.15
k + + +
Iw + + +
ps - - -
pu + + +
W s - + +
W u + + +
IW - - +
U s - + +
Uu + + +
τ - - -
Table 2: Impact of a decrease in λ on macroeconomic variables
more redistributive pension system because his utility decreases with λ.
Let us now consider diﬀerent values which can be taken by , denoting the mortality
diﬀerential. It can be numerically shown that for  ∈ (0, 0.15), A, b and α can keep the
same value without altering the matching properties of our model too much. Let us recall
that the larger  is, the higher inequalities of length of life are. In table 2 we test the
robustness of our results for diﬀerent values of , keeping ϕ at its initial value (ϕ = 0.55).
The sign + (−) means that the redistributivity of pension systems has a monotonous
positive (negative) impact on the variable.
Firstly, comparing the ﬁrst column to the second one, we observe that if life expectancy
inequalities are not suﬃciently high, the indirect eﬀects of a more redistributive pension
system are small, thus skilled agents do not beneﬁt from such a policy. Their utility level
decreases because the decrease in their pension level is higher than the increase in their
wage level.
Secondly, comparing the case in which  = 0.1, to the case in which  = 0.15, we
observe that each qualitative result remains unchanged for diﬀerent values of σ, except for
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the wealth inequality ratio. Indeed, we observe that an increase in the redistributivity of
pension systems decreases wealth inequalities as long as  is not too large. However, for 
suﬃciently high, an increase in the Beveridgian part of pension systems increases wealth
inequalities. The main explanation is that if  is suﬃciently high, unskilled agents do not
beneﬁt from the redistributive properties of pension systems for a long time. Then, the
increase in wage inequalities overcompensates the decrease in pension inequalities.
4.3 The Transitional Dynamic
Let us now consider the transitional dynamic of our macroeconomic variables if the pension
system becomes more redistributive. To study the transitional dynamic, we assume that
 = 0.1. Thus, we consider the case in which, at steady state, the welfare level of every
agent increases. We try to know if there is a transitional cost for agents.
We assume that an economy is initially (at period 1) at steady state. This steady state
is characterized by a given value of the parameter λ. The government changes the value
of this parameter from period 3 on, and every agent expects this change21. We study the
dynamic of our model if the pension is initially Bismarkian (λ = 0.885, as in Hairault
and Langot (2008) on the French case, and as in Hachon (2008)), and if it becomes more
Beveridgian (λ = 0.685).
Concerning capital accumulation, we have k1 = ki, with ki the steady state value of
k with the initial value of λ. Moreover, as equation (17) determines k2 with λ in the
RHS and in the LHS, we also have: k2 = ki. However, as k3 depends on the level of
21Hachon (2008) makes the same exercise with an unexpected change in λ. He obtains the same quali-
tative results.
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pensions of period 3 received by agents born in period 2, then k3 diﬀers from ki. Then, kt
converges towards its new steady state value. Figure 11 illustrates this convergent dynamic.
Figure 13 shows that the welfare level of unskilled agents continuously increases along
the transitional path. However, ﬁgure 12 shows that the welfare level of skilled agents of
generations 2 and 3 decreases compared to the welfare level of skilled agents of period 1,
whereas in the long-term skilled agents beneﬁt from this redistributive policy.
Finally, ﬁgure 14 shows that, at ﬁrst, the wealth inequality ratio highly decreases be-
cause of the direct redistribution of public resources in favour of unskilled agents. However,
from period 3 on, this ratio increases and converges towards its new value because of the
increase in the wage inequality ratio (linked to capital accumulation).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show that an increasing redistribution of pension systems increases capital
accumulation. Given our capital-skill complementarity technology, it implies that a more
redistributive pension system increases wage inequalities. However, in a life-cycle perspec-
tive, this policy redistributes wealth among the population if the mortality diﬀerential is
not too large. Moreover, it is possible even for rich agents to beneﬁt from this structure
because of the increase in capital accumulation.
A future work will introduce an endogenous labor supply and study the distorsive im-
pact of a more redistributive policy. Intuitively, the tax rate should decrease and the capital
accumulation should increase. It would imply that labor supply would be an increasing
function of the degree of redistribution of pension systems. It would dramatically contrast
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with the results of Sommacal (2006).
APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1.
Given assumption 3, equation (17) can be rewritten as:
LHS(Ψ(kt), λ)−RHS(Ψ(kt), kt, λ) = 0
Diﬀerentiating this equation with respect to kt gives:
LHS1()Ψ1()−RHS1()Ψ1()−RHS2() = 0
with fi() the derivative of f() with respect to its ith argument. It implies:
Ψ1() =
RHS2()
LHS1()−RHS1()
Under assumptions 3 and 4 there exists at least one stable steady state ksSS . It implies
that: LHS1()−RHS1()−RHS2() > 0.
Let us now consider the net impact of an increase in λ on ksSS . We diﬀerentiate equation
(17) with respect to ksSS and λ. We obtain:
[LHS1()−RHS1()−RHS2()] dksSS = [RHS3()− LHS2()] dλ
The factor before dksSS is strictly positive under the assumption of stability of the equi-
librium. To determine the sign of dksSS/dλ it is suﬃcient to know the sign of (RHS3() −
LHS2()). We show that it is negative. Indeed as long as ws(k) > wu(k), RHS3() is a
decreasing function of λ because of the positive impact of λ on τ . There only remains to
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know the sign of LHS2(). If it is positive then we prove the proposition.
LHS() can be rewritten as:
LHS(k, λ) = (1 + n)k +
νϕw(k)
ϕ(βR(k))1/η +R(k)
+ (1− e)ν(λwu(k) + (1−
λ)w(k))
[
−R(k)[
(ϕ− )(βR(k))1/η +R(k)] [ϕ(βR(k))1/η +R(k)]
]
It implies that as long as ws(k) > wu(k), then LHS2() > 0.2
Appendix 222:
Firstly, let us give a preliminary result. We consider the case of a perfect competition
on the ﬁnal good market and on inputs markets.
Lemma 1: If there exists a production function Y = F (K,L) satisfying the Inada
conditions, and which is homogenous of degree 1 then we have:
dw
w
=
αK
σK,L
dk
k
=
αK
σK,L
[
dK
K
− dL
L
]
(25)
and
dr
r
= −1− α
α
dk
k
= −1− α
α
[
dK
K
− dL
L
]
(26)
with k = K/L, αK =
KFK()
Y and σK,L the elasticity of substitution between K and L
deﬁned by:
σK,L =
dk/k
d(w(k)r(k) )/(
w(k)
r(k) )
(27)
Proof : We start with the result: w = f(k)− kf ′(k). Then it is suﬃcient to use equa-
tion 27 knowing that dr/dk = f ′′(k) = −dw/dk × 1/k.2
22I thank A.d'Autume for the proof presented here.
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There only remains to apply to apply this result to the production function (5). Then
we have:
dwu
wu
=
αF
σF
(
dG
G
− dL
u
Lu
)
(28)
or
dwu
wu
=
αF
σF
(
αG
dK
K
+ (1− αG)dL
s
Ls
− dL
u
Lu
)
(29)
αF denotes the share of G() in function F (), αG denotes the share of K in G(), and
σF denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two arguments of F (). In the same
way, using the fact that at equilibrium we have:
ws = F ′G.G
′
Ls (30)
we have:
dws
ws
= −1− αF
σF
(
dG
G
− dL
u
Lu
)
+
αG
σG
(
dK
K
− dL
s
Ls
)
(31)
with σG the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs of function G(). The
previous equation implies:
dws
ws
=
[
−1− αF
σF
αG +
αG
σG
]
dK
K
+
[
−1− αF
σF
(1− αG)− αG
σG
]
dLs
Ls
+
1− αF
σF
dLu
Lu
(32)
Assumption A1 implies that for dLs/Ls = dLu/Lu = 0 and if dK/K > 0 then:
dws
ws
>
dwu
wu
⇔ − 1− αF
σF
αG +
αG
σG
>
αF
σF
αG ⇔ 1
σG
>
1
σF
(33)
It means that the wage inequality diﬀerential increases with capital accumulation iﬀ
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the elasticity of substitution between the arguments of function F () is higher than the one
between the arguments of function G().2
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Figure 2: Capital per young (ks) in function of λ
Figure 3: ps(k) in function of λ
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Figure 4: pu(k) in function of λ
Figure 5: W s(k) in function of λ
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Figure 6: W u(k) in function of λ
Figure 7: IW (k) in function of λ
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Figure 8: U s(k) in function of λ
Figure 9: Uu(k) in function of λ
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Figure 10: τ(k, λ) in function of λ
Figure 11: Transitional dynamic of the Annual Interest Rate
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Figure 12: Transitional dynamic of U s
Figure 13: Transitional dynamic of Uu
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Figure 14: Transitional dynamic of IW
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